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Abstract 
 
 
Many organizations struggle with ineffective and/or inefficient access control, but these 
problems and their consequences often remain invisible to security decision-makers. 
Prior research has focused on improving the policy-authoring part of authorization and 
does not show the full range of problems, their impact on organizations, and underlying 
causes. We present a study of 118 individual's experiences of authorization measures in 
a multi-national company and their self-reported subsequent behavior. We follow the 
recent advances in applying economic models to security usability and analyze the 
interrelations of authorization issues with individuals' behaviors and organizational goals. 
Our results indicate that authorization problems significantly impact the productivity and 
effective security of organizations. From the data, we derive authorization Personas and 
their daily problems, which are to a large extent caused by the procedures for policy 
changes and the decision-making, and lead to the circumvention of the measure. As one 
research contribution, we develop a holistic model of authorization problems. More 
practically, we recommend to monitor non-compliance, such as password-sharing, for 
indications of authorization problems, and to establish light-weight procedures for policy 
changes with adequate degrees of centralization and formalization, and support for 
decision-making. 
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1 Introduction
Authorization is a core aspect in organizations to enforce security policies in information systems. While
problems with authorization are frequently reported in form of anecdotes, organizations so far seem
reluctant to conduct a comprehensive review of the problems, or consider their impact on individual
employees' and organizational productivity. One reason is that the problems are only visible to security
decision-makers, such as CISOs, as individual cases. Moreover, the problems are often reduced to
security problems, which are abstract and diﬃcult to turn into a case for addressing the problems [20].
A number of studies have analyzed the usability of authorization and found that crafting authorization
policies1 is diﬃcult, both in laboratory experiments [23, 6] and in organizational practice [3, 18, 21].
However, the problems with authorization cannot be reduced to only the usability of management
tools and the authoring of policies. Models of security economics that include the impact on pro-
ductivity from security usability, such as the Compliance Budget [4], predict, for example, that when
requesting a change in the policy is perceived as too much eﬀort, employees may rather share their
password as a cheaper way of solving the problem. To understand the problems with authorization
thoroughly, we have to consider how authorization aﬀects both the behavior of employees, and the
organizational security and productivity.
The aim of this paper is to foster a broad understanding of usability challenges surrounding existing
authorization mechanisms, their interdependence, and their impact on organizational goals. We apply
economic models to security usability and the organization of information security to motivate our
study. We conducted 118 in-depth interviews on security compliance at a large infrastructure company
with a variety of authorization contexts.
Based on the interviews, we developed Personas [8] to draw a vivid picture of the daily issues
surrounding the user of existing authorization mechanisms. Systematically analyzing causes and eﬀects
of the issues, we identify how they impact organizational goals and what the root causes for the
problems are. We also compare two diﬀerent authorization contexts within the organization, and show
that the procedures for changing authorization policies and the policy decision-making are particularly
important. This includes the degree of formality and centralization of the procedures, the interactions
of stakeholders from diﬀerent perspectives, and their levels of expertise and awareness. Based on our
ﬁndings, we discuss approaches to mitigate the problems.
2 Related work
2.1 Policy authoring
To a large extent, studies in the area of authorization usability focus on the usability of policy authoring
interfaces. Zurko and Simon formulated requirements for a usable policy authoring interface from their
study on usable security [23]. Zurko et al. then developed a policy editor for policies similar to RBAC
based on usability testing and user-centered design that allowed novice users to produce meaningful
results [22].
Rode et al. also studied the challenges in authoring policies [15]. They ﬁnd that policy authors
need to comprehend consequences of the changes and suggest the integration of tasks, monitoring, and
conﬁguration. Reeder et al. add to these ﬁndings by showing that mistakes in policy authoring can
originate from isolated authorization rules in lists that do not convey their interrelation [14]. Vaniea
et al. similarly identiﬁed the cognitive load of conﬂict detection as a major challenge [19].
Focusing instead on the mental model of policy authors, Brostoﬀ et al. found that the primary
challenges lie in understanding the policy structure and the overall authorization paradigm [6]. To
1The term authorization policy is used for the restrictions or permissions enforced by information systems. In contrast,
security policies denote the general rules of conduct with respect to security in an organization.
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Study Study design Environment Focus/scope Findings Recommendations
Sikkel
[16]
Subjective:
interviews
Private and
public orga-
nizations
How users spec-
ify policies
Policies are stated as
grants/denials, reﬁned by
exceptions, e.g. scopes
Provide expressive model:
object grouping, scope,
delegation
Whalen
[21]
Subjective:
survey, inter-
views
Medium-
sized re-
search
laboratory
Individuals'
problems from
mechanisms
Users manage policies,
but struggle with it;
authorization interferes
with primary tasks
Integrate with workﬂows,
support social controls, vi-
sualize policies, and sim-
plify management
Bauer
[3]
Subjective:
interviews
Diverse or-
ganizations
Challenges for
policy profes-
sionals
Problems from stake-
holder interactions and
inadequate models
Support communication of
policy authors, improve
authorization models
Smetters
[18]
Objective:
historical
policy data
Medium-
sized corpo-
ration
Usage of autho-
rization features
and models
Complex, rarely changed
policies, management er-
rors
Simpler models, patterns,
better management tools
Table 1: Prior studies on authorization in organizations
overcome the conceptual mismatches between the authorization model and the mental model of the
security engineer, Inglesant et al. employed iterative development of policies using a controlled natural
language [11].
These laboratory studies focus exclusively on the individual task of authoring policies and further
the usability of this aspect of authorization. However, crafting adequate policies depends to a large
extent on the policy author being in a position to judge which permissions to grant. We thus need
to consider a broader perspective to fundamentally solve authorization challenges in organizations and
incorporate the problems in day-to-day operation of authorization and how stakeholders interact to
mitigate them.
2.2 Challenges in organizations
A small number of broader studies have analyzed how challenges in authorization actually materialize
in organizations, summarized in Table 1. Three of the four identiﬁed studies exclusively focus on the
challenges in policy authoring. Sikkel and Stiemerling [16], Bauer et al. [3], and Smetters and Good
[18] examine how the expressiveness of authorization models aﬀect policy management and suggest
model improvements. In addition, Bauer also analyzes the interactions of policy authors with diﬀerent
roles. In contrast, Whalen not only explores the problems of managing authorization, but also how
authorization interferes with the primary tasks of functional users.
These studies still mostly focus on authorization usability issues on an individual level, primarily
with respect to policy authoring. The consequences of the identiﬁed challenges remain implicit. How-
ever, since most problems rarely become visible for management and then only as anecdotal individual
cases, the authorization issues are still largely ignored in organizations. One reason is that the scale
and the actual impacts on organizational goals are unknown. To make a case for fundamentally ad-
dressing the problems that functional users are faced with every day, the full breadth of authorization
challenges needs to be explored with their complex interrelations and, particularly, their impact on
organizational goals.
2.3 Economic perspective
It is common to consider the impact that usability problems with security mechanisms have  usually
focusing on how users' mistakes reduce security. In authorization, it has been observed, for example,
that entitlements are not adjusted to reﬂect organizational changes, resulting in over-entitlement and
secondary risks, such as more severe consequences in case of a security breach [17]. However, the
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potential additional security risk created by users making mistakes is only one of several consequences
and is often too intangible and abstract to measure and diﬃcult to use as a clear case to argue for
changes [20].
In a novel and promising approach, security researchers have in the last years argued increasingly
on the basis of economic impact on organizations and individuals [2]. Beautement et al. described
the Compliance Budget [4] and Herley analyzed the externalities of security measures [10]. They
argue that we need to take a comprehensive perspective of the costs and beneﬁts of security measures,
particularly from the individuals' point of view, demonstrating that users often do behave rationally
when not complying with security advice. Their examples include the insecure use of USB sticks and
the eﬀects of password policies. This line of research can be applied to authorization as well. As already
noted above, authorization has been found to impact the primary tasks of employees [21]. An example
of the cost of compliance is the eﬀort expended on following the prescribed procedures to change the
policy. More convenient alternatives to compliance could be found, such as sharing passwords. If
the costs of compliance are perceived to be too high and alternatives are perceived as cheaper, even
considering potential consequences, users are likely not comply. We use this model to examine usability
issues with authorization measures.
In a parallel research strand with a focus on the organizational economics, Pallas [12] analyzes
motivation and coordination costs for security measures, comparing hierarchical organizations with
centrally made decisions with market forms with delegation to local decision-makers. Pallas shows that
the extend of coordination and motivation costs depend on the form of organization. Principalagent
theories predict that centrally made decisions often suﬀer from information asymmetries and interfere
with primary tasks. Extending this line of research, we analyze authorization usability challenges for
their impact on the organization.
3 Study design
To derive insights about the interrelations of the multitude of authorization challenges and their impacts
in practice, we studied the security compliance of employees at a large organization, a European, multi-
national company. The organization operates systems and maintains information at several levels of
criticality and sensitivity, involving, amongst others, market regulation as well as the sensitive personal
data of employees and customers.
3.1 Research methodology and sampling
We conducted semi-structured in-depth interviews with 118 employees from management and staﬀ in
two countries between January and September 2010. The interviewees were recruited via the company
newsletter, inviting volunteers to take part in an IT Security Research Study on their experience with
the security policy for a gift voucher. From the about 400 responses within two days, we selected the
participants primarily on a ﬁrst come, ﬁrst served basis, with additional later responses added for
gender balance and an increased breadth of work environments. The interviews lasted approximately
45 minutes, with 40 conducted via telephone and 78 face-to-face. The interview questions covered the
interviewee background, experiences with the security policy, and how it aﬀects the primary tasks.
3.2 Analysis
We focused on the authorization-related segments in the interview transcripts, coding for authorization
usability issues and their causes and eﬀects. Almost two-thirds of the interviewees (75 of 118) mentioned
authorization issues in one of the organizational information systems, including, amongst others, ﬁle
sharing, administrative systems, and restrictions to Web access. Since authorization segments are
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sparsely distributed over the interviews, we coded in a two-stage process. In the ﬁrst pass, we assigned
broad categories of challenges, for example policy change issue to this quote:
they may need temporary access. . . and a lot of the IS setup takes so long that a lot of these
are work arounds to solve a temporary problem. . . problems tend to bounce around. . . for
quite a long while
In the second pass, we then applied open and axial coding to the identiﬁed quotes for ﬁner granu-
larity and to establish relationships between the codes through causal coding. We assigned three types
of codes to quotes: the issue (the speciﬁc challenge, Change lead time in the above example) as well
as causes (Multi-level procedure) and eﬀects of the issue (Social circumvention: Password sharing).
Employing our analysis tool, described below, the coding allowed us to generate causal diagrams of
the authorization challenges.
We were particularly interested in relating the diverse challenges to organizational goals and iden-
tiﬁed the following underlying organizational goals that are aﬀected:
• The eﬀectiveness of the security measure: the degree to which the authorization measure increases
the overall security as intended,
• The eﬃciency of the security measure: the eﬀort expended by employees in operation to achieve
eﬀective security,
• The regulatory compliance of the organization with laws and market regulation,
• The functional eﬀectiveness: the ability of employees to complete their primary tasks despite
authorization restrictions,
• The functional eﬃciency : the eﬀort expended by employees to complete functional tasks, partic-
ularly additional eﬀorts caused by security measures,
• The employee satisfaction: eﬀects on the motivation of employees, such as frustration.
3.3 Challenges analysis tool
We coded 540 quotes in the interview transcripts, associating issues with the system context as well as
causes and eﬀects as tuples or triples in a spreadsheet. We explored the data with a challenge analysis
tool that derives relationships from the coded quotes and generates diagrams using the Graphviz tool
suite2. An example of the diagrams is shown as part of the ﬁndings in Figure 1: causal edges connect
causes with challenges, until reaching impacts on organizational goals at the bottom. The example
above results in the edge from Policy change issue to Circumvention. Since our coding is signiﬁcantly
more detailed, we implemented three levels of details. At the most detailed level, all identiﬁed issues
are shown with their causal and is-a relationships (Password sharing is-a Social circumvention).
In a more abstract representation, all is-a relationships are ﬂattened and the edges of the detailed
level lifted to their parent nodes. The most abstract form is shown in Figure 1 and only displays
challenge categories. The diﬀerent levels of abstraction allow us to both draw high-level conclusions
and analyze the interrelations in detail. The diagrams also convey meaning through their structure,
the node connectedness, and their relative position.
The tool further supported us by ﬁltering the diagrams in two ways: First, by system context,
allowing us to analyze individual authorization contexts. Second, limiting the diagrams to root-
cause/ultimate-impact graphs, only showing those causes and eﬀects that directly or indirectly relate
to given challenges.
2http://www.graphviz.org/
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Persona/Role Motivation Activities Challenges
Amber
Functional
staﬀ
Personal, organi-
zational, society
risks; productivity
Share/access data,
request changes,
circumvent measure
Restrictive policies, degraded productivity, change
lead time and eﬀort, unclear/ineﬀective/ineﬃcient
procedures, non-transparent decisions and policies
Emily
Technically-
informed
staﬀ
Recognition, (see
Amber)
Develop, mitigate is-
sues, make decisions
Non-transparent policies, coarse-grained permis-
sions, lack of usability and functionality, unclear per-
missions, lack of high-level policy, missing expertise,
emotional costs of decisions, informal procedures
Brandon
PA
(see Amber) Make decisions Non-transparent policies
Lauren
Functional
manager
Personal risks
and gains, orga-
nizational/society
risks, productivity
Motivate compli-
ance, make/delegate
decisions, review
policy
Retained permissions, non-transparent policy, inad-
equate model, lack of usability, decision complex-
ity, required expertise, ineﬃcient procedure, ineﬃ-
cient/ineﬀective reviews
Nicole
Administrator,
developer
Personal and or-
ganizational and
society risks, risk
awareness
Administer/develop
applications, make
decisions, support
requests
Lack of high-level policy, cumbersome permissions,
conﬂict of authority
Table 2: Personas related to authorization measures
4 Authorization Personas
Interviewees were aﬀected diﬀerently by authorization measures depending on their roles within the
organization. A common approach would thus be to identify the roles and relate the personal challenges
to the roles. However, roles have the drawback of abstracting detail that is necessary to understand the
behavior of a person. As an alternative to roles, usability engineers employ the Persona methodology
to preserve concrete characteristics, such as motivations and activities, of typical users [8]. Faily and
Flechais successfully used security Personas in security engineering [9].
We followed the approach of Cooper et al. [8] and identiﬁed behavioral variables, such as attitudes,
motivations, and activities, related to authorization in the interview transcripts. We found 11 categories
of behavioral variables with a total of 53 variables. From common combinations of behavior variable
assignments, we derived behavioral patterns and formed ﬁve Personas, listed in Table 2. We then
assigned personal authorization challenges to the individual Personas. Since Personas are originally a
design methodology, it is diﬃcult to validate them outside of design endeavors. However, the breadth
of the study should provide a good initial hypothesis of the Personas and allow for a vivid picture of
how employees are personally aﬀected by authorization.
4.1 Functional staﬀ
Amber is a business analyst in a technical department of the organization. She uses a number of
company IT systems, for example, to share documents with co-workers and access data for analyses. Her
main motivation concerning the use of the systems are her personal productivity, but also the general
organizational eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness, in that the necessary tasks are completed. Authorization
measures aﬀect her most directly through the operational aspects of restrictive policies that hinder her
work or reduce her productivity, for instance, when she cannot access a document that was sent as a
link to her. In some cases she is forced to circumvent the authorization measures and, for example,
use the password of a co-worker to access data in the system. However, she feels uneasy about not
complying with the organization's security policy that forbids the sharing of passwords.
Amber cares about the security of the sensitive data that she is handling, both for the risks that the
organization faces, for example, from a disclosure, but also because of the consequences to her personally
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Productivity impactsDissatisfaction Ineﬀective security Regulatory non-compliance
Policy review issues
Non-transparent policy
Additional measures Inadequate policy
Implementation issues
Policy decision issues
Policy change issues
Circumvention
Figure 1: Categorized authorization challenges
(concerning her employment) or the consequences for the society in general from the disclosure of critical
data. Due to these considerations, she tries to comply with the security policies and requests changes
to the existing permissions, but the requests can require a high eﬀort and take a long time to become
active, both operational authorization issues. For some systems, it is not clear to her how to request
changes or it is known that not all requests succeed. Motivated to keep their documents secure, her
team decided to also protect documents in the system with passwords, in addition to the system's
authorization, since it is not always transparent who has access.
Emily also works as a business analyst, but has more technical experience. She tries to mitigate
the problems with authorization that originate, for example, from too granular permissions or missing
functionality in their systems. Because of her interests, she was tasked to develop the SharePoint site
for her team. As a result, she also manages the permissions to the site, but lacks clear guidance in
the form of a high-level policy to whom she should grant what permissions. She generally does not
feel she has the necessary expertise to make these decisions and it is sometimes unclear to her which
permissions need to be assigned and how to do this correctly. There are only informal procedures for
handling permission requests and she sometimes feels a high emotional pressure to grant permissions,
even though she is unsure whether the permissions are appropriate.
Brandon is the personal assistant to a manager, who has delegated the decisions on who should
receive permissions to him. He has similar attitudes towards information security as Amber, and is
particularly aﬀected by the non-transparency of the current policy, since this makes it diﬃcult to limit
the authorized employees to those with a legitimate need.
4.2 Functional management
Lauren manages 40 employees in the ﬁnancial department and feels responsible for their compliance to
the security policy. She motivates her staﬀ to comply by reminding them of why the data is sensitive,
and the consequences of non-compliance, including sanctions. She is motivated by both consideration
for her own employment (she values job security and also is rewarded for meeting compliance related
performance objectives) and an awareness of the risks to the organization caused by non-compliance
with regulations. At the same time, she also cares about the productivity of her staﬀ.
As part of her role, Lauren needs to make decisions about authorization policies and review existing
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permissions on a regular basis. In this function, she is aﬀected by operational authorization issues,
such as the ineﬃciency of the procedures, when, for example, the procedure requires the signature of
more senior personnel or from other departments. Generally, she sees the policy-authoring aspects
of decision-making as a burden, since the risk-assessment is complex and requires security expertise.
Moreover, it requires signiﬁcant technical expertise to set the permissions due to a lack of usability
of the management tool. The authorization model sometimes does not allow the precise setting of
permissions or they can only be set in ineﬃcient ways, for instance, requiring her to set numerous
permissions for each individual of her staﬀ. Consequently, she delegates some of the decisions to her
subordinates. For reviewing existing policies, the lack of transparency of the current policies causes
a high eﬀort and even limits her ability to review. Since there are no automatic procedures for role
changes, employees will also in many cases retain their permissions. When delegating functional tasks,
Lauren is also aﬀected by the lack of delegation options in the authorization mechanism, forcing her
to sometimes share her password.
4.3 Technical staﬀ
Nicole administrates and develops applications as part of the information system department. Because
of her detailed knowledge of the systems, she is often consulted on how policy changes can be achieved
in the system, for example, which permissions are necessary, and whether the changes are appropriate.
In eﬀect, she takes the decision in many cases, although she is not aware of all relevant high-level
policies and is sometimes caught in conﬂicts of authority, for example, between departments when one
is more security or business-focused than the other. Nicole is also aﬀected by cumbersome permissions
that make the policy management diﬃcult and ineﬃcient, for example, when permissions need to be
set in a number of separate applications to allow an activity.
5 Causes and eﬀects
The authorization issues raised in the interviews allow us to derive general conclusions on authoriza-
tion challenges, their causes and eﬀects. The causal diagram in Figure 1 depicts the interrelation of
challenges at a high level. Beginning at the impacts on organizational goals in the bottom of the dia-
gram and following the causal links backwards, we describe the most severe and frequently mentioned
challenges in the following:
5.1 Restrictive policies and over-entitlements
As stated for the functional staﬀ persona Amber, the main direct impact of authorization on primary
tasks results from its operation through missing permissions due to restrictive policies (40 mentions),
often seen as frustrating and aﬀecting productivity, particularly when accessing the Web (26):
all forums are blocked which is a bit of a pain. . . you are looking for sort of technical
information. . . and you'll ﬁnd an old forum on it and you can't view it so you kind of get
ground to a halt
In contrast, over-entitlements (16) aﬀect the organizational security when users have more permis-
sions than necessary for their work. Interviewees named a number of causes for restrictive policies and
over-entitlements. The most important ones are related to the policy change procedures as well as
to the decision-making for policy changes, discussed below. A further reason is the non-transparency
of policies (13), which leads, for example, to over-entitlement when stakeholders cannot keep track of
who has permissions on folders so that previously required permissions remain. Generally, retained
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permissions (4) are seen as an important cause for over-entitlement, for example, when an employee
changes role within the organization.
5.2 Requesting policy changes
To correct restrictive policies and, less frequently, over-entitlements, functional staﬀ, such as Amber,
request changes to the policy as part of the authorization operation. The most frequently mentioned
issues are the required eﬀort to request changes (15) and the change lead time (14), that is, the duration
from requesting a change until its enactment in the system:
if someone. . . need to get access. . . immediately because it is job critical, then they will use
that password in the meantime while they are waiting for theirs to come through.
The result from those issues is that the requester is forced to circumvent the authorization measure. The
perception of the lead time and required eﬀort also deters the functional stakeholder from requesting a
permission in the ﬁrst place, for example, when convenient circumvention is possible or the permission
is only required temporarily. Similar to these issues are problems of unclear or ineﬀective procedures
(13):
accesses were challenging at the time,. . . knowing who you go to, ask for what and how you
know that that's what you want. . . Shared areas. . . were. . . problematic in identifying where
the data was, who needed to approve the access to it
In these cases, the procedures are unknown or known not to help, thus further increasing the perceived
eﬀort due to the need to discover the procedure or reducing the perceived eﬀectiveness of pursuing a
change of policy.
5.3 Making policy changes
The second perspective on change procedure challenges is from policy authoring, from those deciding
on and implementing the changes to the policies. Several of our identiﬁed personas are involved in these
activities, including functional managers (Lauren), technically-informed functional staﬀ (Emily), per-
sonal assistants (Brandon), and administrators/developers (Nicole). Here, one issue is the informality
of procedures (3), leading, for example, to non-authoritative decisions (13):
The responsibility in my group was just given to people that were the most computer-savvy
at the time.
The primary challenge for decision-makers is the lack of a high-level policy (5) that deﬁnes which
permissions should be granted to whom. Determined to take appropriate decisions, decision-makers
ﬁnd it diﬃcult to properly evaluate requests without this kind of guidance:
I don't know about any policy on who should get access to my SharePoint site. It's just
based on need.
A common consequence is that many decisions are taken without a comprehensive consideration of the
consequences of the decisions (17):
did somebody actually sit there and think `Do you need this access?'. . . I get a person come
and says `Hey, somebody told me I need this, can I have it?' `Give me this form and I can
give it to you [signed].' 
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In this way, decisions are sometimes overly business- or security-driven, leading to over-entitlement and
restrictive policies, respectively. In other cases, decisions are solely based on formalities, for example,
neglecting to consider whether the access is actually necessary as long as the formalities, such as a
speciﬁc training, are fulﬁlled by the requesting employee.
Related to these issues is the problem of conﬂicts of authority (2), for example, when permissions
are bargained between departments:
one of the owners of the. . . shared drive, I'm one of the others, he was allowing all these
other people, saying `I need to put so and so on.' Well, I said `Do they have the [certiﬁca-
tion]? . . .You've given them access to all that information.' 
In other cases, particularly when decisions are decentralized, the emotional costs of denials (2) are
relatively high and might even lead to decision-makers taking inappropriate decisions:
there have been a couple of people that have been `Well, I'm not doing anything with
it,'. . . `Why are you so diﬃcult'
Another challenge arises from the implementation of authorization in information systems. In
systems with inadequate authorization models (11), such as only oﬀering coarse-grained restrictions,
it is diﬃcult to enforce the appropriate restrictions.
So all the things people are working on, everyone has access to. . . that's the granularity
that's given. . . because of the logistics associated with managing that sort of access.
In some cases, the lack of usability of policy authoring also leads to high eﬀort costs when employing
ﬁner-grained restrictions, thus preventing precise restrictions.
5.4 Circumventing authorization measures
The interviewees frequently reported that authorization operation issues, foremost restrictive policies
and the perceived eﬀort for policy changes, lead to the circumvention of the system, for example,
through sharing passwords with coworkers:
Sometimes people don't have access to information that they need to do their job and
therefore the passwords are shared within teams. And I ﬂagged that before, but it does
happen, because it can take so long, months, to get something through. So it would be, `Use
somebody else's account.' 
Overall, interviewees describe a high level of compliance in the organization, for example, generally
feeling uneasy when not complying. Considering the general tendency to comply, the high number of
mentions of circumventions related to authorization (58) is alarming. The identiﬁed circumventions
diﬀer widely in severity with respect to their impact on the organizational goals. Circumventions range
from sending documents by email instead of changing the policy to the sharing of passwords to grant
access. We grouped the types of circumventions into the following categories:
• Workarounds (13): using technical means within the system, for example, using multiple accounts,
• Technical circumvention (20): using technical means outside of the system, such as sending
documents on physical media,
• Social circumvention (25): employing social means to work around authorization measures, such
as sharing passwords.
We summarized the types of circumventions with examples and potential eﬀects in Table 3 and
found that circumventions impact ﬁve of the six organizational goals, including the productivity (secu-
rity and functional eﬃciency), security eﬀectiveness, regulatory compliance, and employee satisfaction.
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Table 3: Workarounds, technical and social circumventions of authorization measures
Workaround/circumvention Example Eﬀects
Utilize tech. loopholes (6) Rename attachment extension Functional ineﬃciencies
Increase redundancy (3) Copy a document to a place which can be ac-
cessed
Ineﬃcient, non-transparent policy
Multiple accounts (2) Switch between accounts for diﬀerent permis-
sions
Undermines identity scheme, ineﬃ-
cient
Spare accounts (1) Teams e.g. prepare a number of accounts for
new temps
Potential missing traceability of ac-
tivities
Make doc. public (1) Move document to a public folder to allow access Undermines policy enforcement
Share through alternative
media (12)
Send document by email or physically on CD,
rather than changing the policy
Loss of control over data; potentially
increased risk; redundancy of data
Use private device (6) Access information not available from work de-
vices from smartphone or home PC
Risks from data on devices not gov-
erned by organization's security pol-
icy
Use external system (2) Post documents on an organization-external sys-
tem to grant access to externals
Risks from documents outside of the
organization's security realm
Share passwords (21) Share password instead of waiting for permis-
sions to be changed
Lack of traceability/audibility;
breaking security policy
Coworkers as proxy (3) Turn to coworkers for a task due to lacking per-
missions
Potentially ineﬃcient
Share logged-in account (1) Have coworkers complete tasks at a logged-in
computer
Lack of traceability/audibility
6 Authorization Paradigms
In the previous section, we studied general causes and eﬀects of authorization issues. However, employ-
ees of the organization are aﬀected by challenges in a broad range of systems that inhibit very diﬀerent
characteristics with respect to the authorization context. To analyze how these characteristics aﬀect
the challenges, we selected two system contexts, Shared folders and Microsoft SharePoint, for a fo-
cused, comparative analysis. These systems are similarly employed and were mentioned frequently,
but have opposing characteristics, representing diﬀerent authorization paradigms in the formality and
centralization of the change procedures and decision-making.
6.1 Microsoft SharePoint
Microsoft SharePoint is used in the organization for the sharing of documents in teams, departments,
and organization-wide. Departments and teams develop and manage local SharePoint sites, includ-
ing the authorization policy that deﬁnes the restrictions on the access of SharePoint-hosted resources,
granted for individual employees. A high-level visualization of the interrelation of authorization chal-
lenges is shown in Figure 2. Most impacts are on the eﬀectiveness of security and regulatory compliance,
primarily causing circumventions of the authorization measures in the system, for example, using email
for sharing instead of adapting the policy, and permissive policies (inadequate policies). These, in turn,
mostly result from issues with the policy change procedures and decisions, which are detailed in Ta-
ble 4. Implementation problems, such as usability problems with the policy management, and the lack
of transparency of the policies, preventing implicit policy reviews, aﬀect organizational goals to a lesser
degree.
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Productivity impacts Ineﬀective security Regulatory non-compliance
Non-transparent policy
Inadequate policy
Implementation issues
Circumvention
Policy decision issues
Policy change issues
Figure 2: Categorized challenges related to SharePoint sites
Table 4: Comparing mentions of problems with decisions and procedures
SharePoint Shared folders
Issues Dec. Proc. Dec. Proc.
Decentralized decisions 2
Required/present expertise 5
Lack of high-level policy 3
Non-comprehensive decision 3
Business-driven decisions 1
Coarse-grained restrictions 2 1
Lack of usability 2
Change lead time 2 7
Required change eﬀort 4
Ineﬀective change procedures 2 2
Availability of authority 2 1
Informal procedure 1 1
Ineﬃcient procedure 5
Unclear procedure 1 4
Conﬂicts of authority 1
Non-authoritative decision 5 1
Eﬀects
Loss of traceability 2
Over-entitlement 5 8
Restrictive policy 1 6
Circumvention 8 13
Ineﬃcient security 2 5
Functional eﬃciency 3 9
23 29 9 59
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Productivity impacts Ineﬀective security Regulatory non-compliance
Implementation issues
Additional measures
Inadequate policy
Circumvention
Policy change issues
Figure 3: Categorized challenges related to Shared folders
6.2 Shared folders
Shared folders represent the traditional way of sharing documents in the organization. These are
meant to be replaced by the above-discussed SharePoint infrastructure. Users access a shared network
drive from their desktop through the ﬁle explorer. Authorization is primarily enforced on a folder
level. In contrast to the SharePoint procedures, folder permissions are granted to employees through
a centralized process. As depicted in Figure 3, the policy change procedures were mentioned in the
interviews most frequently as challenges that impact, directly or indirectly, on the eﬀectiveness of
security, productivity, and regulatory compliance. The policy change issues are given in Table 4,
including the important aspects of high perceived change eﬀort and change lead time.
6.3 Comparison
While apparently similar in terms of structures, the challenges of the two contexts reveal a number
of diﬀerences when focusing on change procedures and policy decisions. Speciﬁcally, procedure issues
are more prevalent with Shared folders. Table 4 shows that procedure issues (column Proc.) are
mentioned more frequently for Shared folders than for SharePoint. For instance, the change lead time
and the required change eﬀort is most relevant for Shared folders. Accordingly, there is less mention of
circumvention and productivity impacts from hindering work or ineﬃcient procedures for SharePoint
sites.
While the SharePoint procedure has fewer negative impacts overall, there can be more severe
problems with the procedure if, for example, the responsible person does not respond:
Sometimes you don't get a response for months and you don't know who to chase. At least
with the Shared folders [process] you've got the request number and you can ring up about
it.
Overall, the severity index of procedure issues, derived from the sum of mentions, shown in the bottom
row of the table, is signiﬁcantly lower for SharePoint.
A second area of eﬀects of the paradigms are the decisions on policy changes. As the severity index
in the table indicates, decision problems are signiﬁcantly more frequent for SharePoint than for Shared
folders. Primarily, there is a concern in the case of SharePoint that due to the local decisions and the
informal nature of the procedure, the decisions might not in all cases be adequate and the local policy
administrators may lack security expertise:
a user who is not trained properly can actually give, access to everything quite easily
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through a couple of clicks, um, in SharePoint I think it is quite easy to not give access to
the right areas. . . because it has quite a confusing way of giving permissions
In contrast, there is only a small number of mentions of decision problems for Shared folders.
Overall, our results indicate that it is more eﬃcient to have decisions taken and enacted locally than
in a centralized procedure. Problems with local changes foremost arise from overly informal procedures
and a lack of expertise in decision-making. These results are in line with Pallas' theory [12], which
predicts the trade-oﬀ between hierarchical and market forms of coordination for information security
in organizations. Particularly, we see the eﬀects of information asymmetries in the lack of expertise of
local decision-makers and the high hierarchical coordination costs for centralized decisions.
7 Discussion
Our ﬁndings on authorization issues and their interrelation, and the more focused results of comparing
centralized/structured with local/informal procedures and decision-making oﬀer a detailed picture of
challenges in organizational authorization. Our results are based on the study of a single organization
and the analysis of subjective data. The quantity of mentions may be skewed by the sampling of
participants who may have had reason to volunteer for the study so our quantitative results should not
be taken as proof. However, this being a rich data set of 118 interviews together with the variety of users
and authorization contexts, the results from the study allow us to provide a thorough description of
the problems and formulate well-grounded hypotheses on the causes of usability issues in authorization
for further research.
7.1 Guide and monitor circumventions
Circumventions of authorization measures are not necessarily the inferior option, particularly when
considering the losses of productivity that would occur otherwise, for instance, when waiting for poli-
cies to be changed. However, the interviewees often stated that they feel uncomfortable when they are
forced to break a security policy and consider potential negative impacts from additional risks. More-
over, architectural authorization measures cannot entirely prevent their circumvention. Formal rules
through security policy and informal rules through common understanding in teams must complement
architectural measures [12, 21].
• Provide formal rules on circumventions: Formal rules can deﬁne in security policies, for instance,
which circumventions are permissible in speciﬁc situations. Particularly accounting for the eﬀects
of the Compliance Budget (see Section 2.3), employees need a comprehensible and actionable
policy, so that compliance can be focused on high-risk issues and employees can be guided to use
the circumvention with the least negative eﬀects on the organizational goals.
• Foster informal rules on circumventions: Informal rules are built and enforced through social
interaction, often on a team level. Awareness campaigns and technological means can shape the
informal rules by providing focused input on the risks of diﬀerent kinds of circumventions [20].
• Monitor circumventions: Our ﬁndings on the eﬀects of authorization issues show that circum-
ventions are a good indicator of underlying issues and should be monitored closely to identify
optimization potential for existing policies and procedures.
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7.2 Establish adequate procedures
We found many cases in which the procedures for policy changes caused authorization issues. These
issues are part of the operation of authorization, so that this extends the prior work on supporting the
communication between stakeholders in policy authoring (see Section 2.2).
• Deﬁne and communicate procedures: Procedure ambiguity and informality have serious eﬀects on
the eﬀectiveness of change operations and organizational productivity. Clearly communicating
the procedures to functional stakeholders will also lower the threshold for requesting changes.
• Reduce the (perceived) change lead time and change eﬀort : Circumventions are often caused by
the duration for the changes to be enacted and the eﬀort to initiate changes. Applying economic
models to security usability (see Section 2.3), reveals that we need to reduce the costs of compli-
ance. We thus expect that a reduction of change lead time and eﬀort and their perception will
result in less circumventions. However, the relation between the perceived costs and compliance
is likely to be non-linear, so that we need to reach a speciﬁc target threshold for compliance to
become the default.
• Adjust the degree of centralization: Theoretical models [12] and our observations on diﬀerent
authorization paradigms show that decentralized procedures and decisions can be advantageous,
given that the decision-makers have baseline security expertise (see below) and the procedures
remain traceable. More decentralized procedures can also formalize informal delegation and,
thus, improve the traceability.
7.3 Support policy decisions
Our results indicate that many authorization challenges originate in the decision-making part of policy
authoring:
• Provide high-level policies on authorization decisions: Decision-makers need to be supported in
taking appropriate decisions on grants and denials. One way to provide support is through high-
level policies on how to decide on requests. Similar to the high-level policies on circumvention,
these policies need to be adequate for the speciﬁc context, actionable, and comprehensible.
• Increase the expertise and awareness of decision-makers: In addition to providing guidance on
decisions, additional expertise and awareness on consequences from decisions, both on risks from
grants and functional impacts from denials, will help to improve the appropriateness of decisions
[20].
• Provide decision support to policy makers: A further option to support decision-makers is to
oﬀer dedicated tools that help in the decision-making process. These can collect factors on the
sensitivity of the data and potential consequences of unintended disclosures as well as request-
speciﬁc factors, such as the purpose of the request. From these factors, a comprehensible overview
of decision factors may then be generated to increase the awareness for the full breadth of aspects.
This follows the similar suggestions on decision support, such as for password policies [13] and
security investments [5], and may also include the risk perception of functional staﬀ [7].
• Improve authorization models and management tools: As shown in prior work on policy editing
and challenges in practice (Sections 2.1 and 2.2), appropriate and usable policy editing tools
and authorization models are required for eﬀective measures. Our results conﬁrm those ﬁndings,
showing that the precision of policies is governed by the appropriateness of the authorization
model.
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Strategic security
management
Model and implementation
Organizational security, productivity,
and regulatory compliance
Functional
management
Operational security
management
Development
and integration
Policy decision
Change procedure
Authorization policy
Context and behavior
Affected
artifact
Responsibility for
problems and mitigation
Tactical security
management
Figure 4: Layered interrelations between issues with authorization artifacts
Table 5: Artifacts in authorization and how issues with them aﬀect the other layers
Artifact Responsibility Activity Example issue Primarily aﬀected Example mitigation
Model, im-
plementation
Development,
integration
Develop,
integrate
Unusable model or
interface
Policy author Improve model or
tool usability
Policy
decision
Strategic sec.
management
Make high-
level policy
Missing high-level
policy
Policy author,
decision-maker
Provide high-level
policy
Change
procedure
Tactical sec.
management
Design
process
High change lead
time, ineﬃcient pro-
cedure
Functional staﬀ, pol-
icy author, decision-
maker
Establish light-
weight procedure
Authorization
policy
Operational
sec. mgmt.
Change
policy
Restrictive policy,
permissive policy
Functional staﬀ,
organization
Grant adequate per-
missions
Context and
behavior
Functional
management
Inﬂuence
behavior
Reduced productiv-
ity, circumvention
Organization Increase risk aware-
ness
7.4 A holistic approach
Our ﬁndings show that eﬀective mitigation of authorization problems requires addressing several inter-
related aspects. To visualize the layers and their relationships, we can abstract from the found causal
relations and structure the problems by the aﬀected artifact as depicted in Figure 4. In the diagram,
the issues in upper-layer artifacts foremost aﬀect lower layers and ultimately the organizational goals
(cf. Table 5).
Prior work on authorization problems primarily focused on policy authoring (cf. Section 2.2), which
can be found in the Authorization policy layer. From the interrelations between the given layers, we can
expect that such a selective focus will only solve part of the problem. There are indirect eﬀects of higher
layers that will reduce the eﬀectiveness of mitigations on individual layers. One of the examples given
in Table 5 is the missing guidance for decisions on the Policy decision layer that impacts the adequacy
of policy changes. If this problem exists, focusing selectively on the usability of the conﬁguration
interface might prove ineﬀective. Instead, we need to broaden the analysis and mitigation of problems
with organizational authorization.
8 Conclusions
We analyzed 118 interviews for challenges with authorization measures and their interrelation with
organizational goals. In line with prior practical studies, we found that the authorization models
and policy authoring tools impact the authorization usability. Beyond prior ﬁndings, we identiﬁed
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signiﬁcant issues with the operation of authorization from the procedures for policy changes and the
decision-making part of policy authoring. Moreover, we showed that the authorization issues are deeply
interrelated and aﬀect the organizational goals of eﬀective security and productivity.
One common consequence of problems with authorization is the circumvention of the security
measure. Interestingly, while Adams and Sasse [1] showed how users circumvent security measures due
to a lack of security awareness, our participants reported a high number of circumventions to complete
their work despite being security-conscious and uncomfortable with breaking the policy. This trade-oﬀ
between productivity and security risks supports the economic models on security compliance [4, 10].
On an organizational level, we showed that the degree of centralization and formality is a crucial
factor in designing authorization measures as predicted by Pallas' theories on organizational information
security [12]. Centralized and formal procedures simplify traceability and sound decisions, but increase
hierarchical coordination costs. Conversely, delegated, localized decisions and procedures may reduce
overhead and circumventions, and increase productivity, at the cost of information asymmetries.
The study is only based on interviews in one organization and the subjective data drawn from them
so that we must be careful when drawing general conclusions from the number of mentions. However,
the organization has very diverse authorization contexts and the rich data set includes a wide variety of
stakeholders. Moreover, where overlapping, our ﬁndings are in line with prior studies on organizational
authorization and ﬁt with models from security usability and management. Thus, the results oﬀer a
detailed description of the problems, make a case for organizations to address them, and should serve
as an initial hypothesis for further, quantitative research.
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